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Post-wristband Blues: the Mixed Fortunes of UK Development Campaigning under 
austerity and the Conservatives. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
2005 witnessed the rolling out of the Make Poverty History development campaign 
coalition. The general, but not unanimous, view was that Make Poverty History 
(MPH) made tangible headway on many of its demands. Member NGOs generally 
declared the campaign a success, and the celebrity advocates that grabbed media 
attention spoke about historic victories. Seen in retrospect, this moment of success 
seems rather bathetic, the last great hurrah of a campaign logic that subsequently 
fell into abeyance. From 2006 onwards, individual campaign organisations each 
made a quieter and less celebratory post-mortem of the 2005 moment before 
returning to organisation-specific campaigning.i  
There was a general understanding that large collaborative campaigns were unlikely 
to happen again and that some damage to its prospects had been wrought by the 
Make Poverty History  campaign. As a result of economic recession from 2008, the 
meta-narrative of British politics shifted to crisis and austerity. In 2010, New Labour 
was replaced by a coalition government of Conservative and Liberal Democrat, in 
which the latter were dominant. This election outcome removed a key institutional 
relationship that development campaigners had come to rely on: a ruling party that 
shared many of the development norms of the campaign organisations themselves. 
Nevertheless, in 2013, a major national development campaign coalition was once 
again devised: the Enough Food If campaign (EFIF). This article explores the 
motivations and strategies that underpinned the construction of a campaign 
coalition in such adverse circumstances. The first section sets out the difficult legacy 
left by Make Poverty History before proceeding in the second section to consider the 
changed environment within which EFIF emerged. The third section looks at EFIF in 
some detail, paying particular attention to the ways in which it faced both the MPH 
legacy and the new political environment. The fourth section sets out an argument 
that the major logic of the campaign was to lock in a success narrative from 
beginning to end, over and above other strategic campaign aims, and in this sense to 
shake off the post-wristband blues of its time. Finally, the article concludes. 
 
THE ROAD TO 2015 
The Make Poverty History effect 
Make Poverty History was, in a sense, the best of times and the worst of times for 
development campaigning. Its most convincing success was its ability to mobilise 
some level of awareness and engagement from large numbers of people. Reportedly, 
as many as eight million white wristbands were worn. The support base of the 
coalition expanded massively, a base that was also designed to give supporters an 
opportunity to ‘migrate’ into a specific campaign organisation. The demonstrations 
around the Gleneagles G8 Summit and media impact of the Live 8 concerts 
generated moments of media saturation in which it was difficult for anyone to avoid 
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the campaign. The level of cultural endorsement from celebrities, media, and 
politicians was exceptional.  
These features might be considered as intrinsic victories, ones that relate to the aims 
of campaigning itself: public mobilisation, the growth of campaign organisations, the 
legitimation of their purposes. One can also argue that the campaign’s extrinsic 
purposes were achieved to a considerable degree. That is, the policy objectives of 
the campaign were largely met.ii The G8 Summit led to commitments to aid and debt 
reduction which, for some campaign coalition members, demonstrated the success 
of MPH. Within the campaign, people had different expectations of what ‘success’ 
might mean, but many – especially from the larger organisations – considered the 
outcomes to be positive, at least in regards to aid and debt. The dominant metaphor 
at the time was that a mountain had successfully been climbed but that this revealed 
other peaks in the near distance.  
However, this metaphor was itself a symptom of the fact that MPH was not an 
absolute success. The G8 would not make poverty history in any tangible sense. The 
campaign messages throughout 2004-5 relayed a sense of epochal temporality: 
making history by making poverty history;  a momentous year in which the direction 
of the future of poverty was to be decided by ‘eight men in a room’. The campaign 
logic was that this was a ‘now or never’ moment. The fact that, especially  after July, 
the campaign presented to the public a victory that would not make poverty history 
but rather offer a significant step forward over the next few years if the G8 leaders 
honoured their commitments which were a ‘good enough’ success rather than an 
historic victory generated significant anxiety within the coalition in terms of 
expectation management and the extent to which the G8 had the political will to 
fulfil its commitments as the years passed.iii  
Furthermore, for some coalition members, the commitments were not worth 
celebrating; a ‘whisper’ rather than a ‘roar’ (Abugre 2005). The commitments of the 
G8 were seen as not equal to the task of mass poverty reduction, and the 
commitments that were made did not modify prevailing neoliberal development 
practices and ideologies. As the campaign progressed towards the G8, some 
coalition members had become so concerned about the closeness of the campaign 
to New Labour that they left the coalition, judging that both the politics of the 
campaign and the ability of New Labour to use it to boost their own legitimacy made 
it effectively morally and politically bankrupt (Hodkinson 2005). Reports seeped out 
as the year went on of considerable disagreement within the coalition.  
As a result, as the dust settled on a campaign that ostensibly lasted a year but was all 
but over by August, the public celebration of ‘mission accomplished’ dissolved into a 
rather complicated, diffuse, and dour ratcheting down of the coalition as each 
member reflected on the pros and cons of the endeavour and moved back into their 
own silos with both positive and negative lessons from the coalition. 
From 2005 to 2010, development NGOs maintained low-level networking and 
information sharing, mainly through BOND (British Overseas NGOs for Development), 
the organisational hub for development NGOs. The NGOs continued to work within a 
context that was still underpinned by a positive relationship between the larger 
NGOs and the New Labour government. In other words, the fall-out of MPH was in 
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some degree calibrated by a government that remained positively-disposed to the 
mainstream development campaigning project. As a result, it was relatively easy for 
large NGOs to transition out of MPH. Indeed, some took aspects of MPH’s imagery 
and discourse into their own unilateral campaigns and maintained the kinds of 
working relations with government that were at the heart of MPH. This kind of 
transition was enjoyed mainly by the large NGOs that led the campaign, especially 
Oxfam, Christian Aid, Action Aid, CAFOD and Save the Children UK. A second distinct 
group (notably War on Want and World Development Movement, now Global 
Justice Now) spent this time moving into a more explicitly ‘social movement’ frame 
which was considerably more cynical about New Labour.  
In retrospect, the five years after 2005 look like the six years before 2005. There was 
a ruling party with an ideology that was sympathetic to the core norms of the 
development campaign NGO community; there was a well-institutionalised and 
resourced NGO sector in which each organisation had its membership, institutional 
specificities, and networks; there were a series of organisation-specific campaign 
issues that generated advocacy and fund raising in specific development areas 
(Porteous 2008:12, 19).  
 
International development, NGOs and New Labour 
New Labour’s relationship with the development campaign community defines this 
period. The Labour party had campaign, social, and ideological roots in 
internationalism and Third Worldism (Howe 1993). This is evident in its Fabian 
politics, its connections with anti-apartheid (Vickers 2011, Bush 1999: 248 et seq.), 
its links with labour unions that had solidarity connections with post-colonial unions 
and movements, and with socially-progressive church organisations. From 1997, 
New Labour condensed these variegated developmentalist associations into a strong 
normative discourse around ethics and virtue in international relations and 
development (Gallagher 2011); one component of New Labour’s international 
development ethics was partnerships with development NGOs.  
New Labour understood international development in what might be broadly 
glossed as progressively liberal. Good governance, development partnership, 
capabilities approaches, civil society and NGOs, and a socially-progressive market-
based economy were the pivots of New Labour’s vision of a development future. The 
UK’s development NGOs fitted well into this vision as providers of resources, good 
development partners, and friends of civil society. Both Government and NGOs 
shared a strong desire to galvanise a pro-development constituency within the 
British public (Biccum 2007, Manzo 2006). New Labour channelled significant 
amounts of official development assistance through selected NGOs. It invested in 
both research and public relations to promote the construction of a form of 
knowledge based in a revived, ethical, and effective aid project in which UK NGOs 
played a pivotal role. The creation and political focus on DFID embodied New 
Labour’s developmental intentions. From its origins, DFID took on something of a 
campaign role itself: its foundational statement of intent Building Support for 
Development, could easily have been on a major campaign NGO’s website. Arch 
celebrity campaigner Bono spoke at New Labour’s 2004 party conference; Bob 
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Geldof was asked by Blair to act as a celebrity-advocate for the Africa Commission 
(Street 2012).  
This comity between development NGOs and New Labour was the political context 
within which the rise and fall of MPH was managed, and it came to an end in 2010. 
In the next section, we will map out the salient political changes that took place after 
2010. We present these changes as a context within which another campaign 
coalition emerged in 2013. Bearing in mind how inauspicious the circumstances were 
for a post-MPH campaign coalition, we need to explore the features of the campaign 
not only on their own terms but also as a response to a generally rather depressing 
state of affairs for international development campaigning. Seen in this light, the 
Enough Food If campaign is best understood as an attempt to re-define a modus 
operandi and vivendi for development NGOs in a context significantly transformed 
from that of the previous thirteen years. 
 
NEW GOVERNMENT 
It is important to start with a note of moderation. It is not the case that the coming 
to power of the Coalition government or indeed the subsequent Conservative 
government represented any kind of totalising counter-revolution in development 
policy. Indeed, for many analysts on the Left, the short history of Blair’s New Labour 
and David Cameron’s Conservatism was one of substantial convergence. Both in 
terms of public image, leadership style, and substantive areas of policy strategy, New 
Labour and Conservative policy shared a great deal.  
New Labour reconciled itself to a non-socialist and broadly liberal policy agenda, 
based in a faith that private business and socially-beneficial competition would 
address the core concerns of the party: inequality and poverty (Porteous 2008). 
Within this intellectual framing, international aid was largely articulated within a 
neoliberal framework. One could see this in the Africa Commission Report (2005), a 
report which fed into the Government’s preparations for the G8 and engagement 
with MPH (Brown 2006). DFID also embraced a vision of development through 
support for competitive market-based growth and the facilitating of a positive role 
for transnational corporations and unconstrained markets: making globalisation 
work for the poor (Cammack 2001).  
The Conservative party publically affirmed that it would commit to the 0.7% GNP aid 
target which was previously a key aspiration of New Labour. Making this 
commitment publically allowed the Tories a fairly cheap means of brand 
decontamination (Heppell and Lightfoot 2012), emerging as it was from a public 
image of sleaze and self-interest. Cameron’s Big Society, ‘golden thread’ in 
development, and quality of life conceptual orientations also fed into a development 
vision that was moderately distinct but substantially similar to New Labour’s. Both 
party’s orientations regarding international development were fundamentally based 
in a vision of good governance, open economies, competitive markets, and a faith 
that liberal political sociability would spread unproblematically into poor societies if 
all of the former components were in place. The two parties offered different points 
of emphasis and articulation within a substantially shared development vision. 
Page 4 of 38The British Journal of Politics and International Relations
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review
 O
nly
Thus, there was no great shift in international development thinking by the Coalition 
or Conservative governments. But, this did not mean that nothing changed. In the 
first place, campaign organisations were now faced with a political party that had 
been culturally and ideologically distant from it. Few Conservative MPs considered 
international development as a major policy issue and, compared with New Labour, 
there was a weaker pro-aid constituency. More broadly the Conservative party in 
Parliament and amongst its membership were ideologically hostile to international 
development campaigning values, which had been constructed out of a Fabian, 
socialist, and social-democratic Christian bundle of values. More practically, 
development NGOs simply did not have good advocacy networks with Conservative 
MPs. All of the celebrity advocates taken up by campaign NGOs were broadly on the 
left and culturally anti-Tory. The NGOs’ policy positions on things like trade, climate 
change, and transnationals were clearly more distant from Tory views than they 
were under New Labour for all of the convergence at the heart of policy. This new 
environment was uncertain and potentially adversarial. 
Secondly, in some ways, the Conservatives have shifted international development 
strategy, although this has not been as publicised as perhaps it should be. The core 
shift has been away from good governance and partnerships with aid recipient states 
which was at the very heart of New Labour’s strategy. In its place there is a far 
stronger focus on private companies as key development partners (Mawdsley 2015). 
The Conservative government has consolidated an aid model based in the 
contracting of private companies. This was present during the New Labour 
administration (Taylor 2012: 454), but there is also a more clear strategic orientation 
by the Conservatives to present private companies as ‘developmental’. And, large 
amounts of DFID expenditure go on private company services. Beyond the actual 
payments to contracted private enterprises, aid strategy has, in a sense, been 
corporatised in that the kinds of claimed knowledge and skills that private 
companies have are perceived as part of the international aid project itself. One can 
see this most clearly in the new green revolution for Africa (AGRA) (Kaarhus 2011). 
One can also see it in the providing of technological and infrastructural services by 
large transnationals. Discrete projects to promote microfinance, communications 
technology connectivity, the introduction of new seeds, and training all involve 
private corporations as service providers, knowledge holders, and aid recipients. The 
Conservative approach to development was/is more concertedly ‘corporate’ in that 
business is seen as a direct agent for the promotion of development, not just a 
source of capital which, according to most economic models (and subject to the right 
policy environment), generate developmental effects. We shall come back to this 
strategic reorientation later more specifically in regards to EFIF’s concern with 
hunger and malnutrition. 
It seems sensible to conclude that the direction of movement under the Tories 
was/is concertedly towards a model of funding private companies directly to do 
development work and in the process celebrating this sector as the driver of change. 
Inasmuch as this is the case, it poses a challenge to NGOs who had customarily 
focussed around the activities of NGO, civil society, and partner government 
initiatives. This was the core dispensation throughout the thirteen years of New 
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Labour. From 2010, campaign NGOs were faced with a sectoral context defined by a 
post-MPH legacy and a new and ostensibly less amenable government.  
And, of course, the shift in the British party system roughly overlapped with the 
global economic crisis. This fed into the NGO sector in a way familiar to other 
economic crisis moments previously: it generated a concern that fiscal austerity 
would impact upon the aid budget, that rising unemployment and stagnant 
disposable incomes would reduce charitable donations, and that the general public 
mood would shift against aid because of a concern for the poor ‘at home’. The rise of 
UKIP was explicitly based in arguments about massively reducing or abolishing aid, 
laced with barely-disguised racism.  
It was this context within which Cameron’s explicit endorsement of the 0.7% figure 
and declaration of ‘One World’ Conservatism opened the door very slightly to a new 
working relation between international development NGOs and the government. 
Against some currents within his own party and somewhat against the austerity 
narrative his party enthusiastically embraced in most areas, Cameron’s leadership 
identified overseas development assistance as a diagnostic of its social conscience. 
This rather marginal and protean development within the Tories is vital to 
understanding the emergence of EFIF. 
 
ENOUGH FOOD IF 
 
A window of opportunity 
Campaign coalitions offer an opportunity to understand the nature of campaigning 
in a way that is especially revealing. Most obviously, one can explore the dynamics of 
relations between individual campaign organisations because they are having to 
work together formally as part of a single political project. Secondly, the campaign 
coalition itself requires co-ordination, all manner of dialogue, the construction of a 
shared discourse, and the establishing of an institution that manages, leads, and co-
ordinates the efforts of individual NGOs. Thirdly, campaign coalitions’ core purpose 
is to create a high-publicity action that strongly and publically engages with 
government or other official development agencies. As such, campaign coalitions 
offer a revealing way to explore the place of individual development campaigns 
within a broader British polity and public space. It is in this light that we shall explore 
the Enough Food If campaign of 2013. EFIF emerged shortly after the changes 
outlined in the previous section, a fact that raises key questions concerning the 
ability of development NGOs to negotiate a terrain defined by a sense that 
something similar to MPH was unlikely to happen again and that the relatively 
amenable political environment of New Labour had been replaced by something 
more problematic.  
The Enough Food IF campaign became a coalition of over 200 NGOs, oriented around 
issues of global hunger and malnutrition. In 2012, David Cameron hosted a post-
Olympics Hunger Summit in 2012, a ‘summit’ that was largely a 
celebrity/sportsperson-endorsed expression of concern about global hunger, 
claiming that this would be a major international issue for the Government leading 
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into its hosting of the G8 the subsequent year. ONE and Save the Children attended 
and the summit spoke warmly about Cameron’s commitment. The EFIF coalition 
identified this moment as the ‘open door’ through which Britain’s development 
NGOs might find a revived role in the new political environment. This marked an 
opportunity for major development campaign NGOs: a statement of government 
openness to campaigning and a high-profile event in which ‘hunger’
iv
 would be a 
prominent focus. 
The large development NGOs with strong lobbying abilities have always sought the 
ear of politicians. This was at the heart of MPH. It was also the case that these NGOs 
sought an audience with Gordon Brown (and him with them) when he became Prime 
Minister; and it was also the case when the Conservative Party came to power.v The 
purpose of these informal  contacts was to secure a certain common ground 
between the Government’s agenda for the G8 and the kinds of campaign goals that 
the development NGO sector might advocate. There is a symbiosis here in which a 
ruling party enjoys a ‘halo effect’ from publically supporting aspects of development 
NGOs’ campaigns and NGOs can make claims to success based in expectations that 
some of their ‘asks’ are informally assured as amenable to the government.  
Thus, it seems reasonable to identify the beginnings of the coalition in 2012 when 
some NGOs were speaking with each other informally and also in communication 
with the government, all around the notion of hunger which had been identified as a 
strong starting position for ‘detoxifying’ the Conservative Party. A broad agenda that 
would reflect a development coalition’s common interests and also have a 
reasonable chance of being supported in part by the UK government could serve as a 
starting point for coalition building in earnest.  
In October 2012, a BOND Annual General Meeting was held in which plans for a 
coalition around food and hunger to focus on the G8 were mooted. At this point, a 
group of prominent and relatively radical NGOs chose to remove themselves from 
the coalition, expressing concerns about the focus on hunger and the apparent lack 
of adversarialism concerning the Conservative-dominated government (interviews 
War on Want, Jubilee Debt Coalition).  
 
Finding common cause 
From November 2012 onwards, EFIF Assembly meetings rolled out a series of actions 
to focus mainly on the UK-hosted G8 in June 2013.
vi
 Member NGOs reported on their 
own actions, and the Organising Committee (OC) members shared information 
about the broader strategy for the UK budget and the G8 ‘moments’. A set of four 
core themes related to hunger were set out, partly as the outcome of talks with 
Cameron, partly as important and inclusive campaign themes. 
The EFIF campaign was publically launched at Somerset House, London, on the 23rd 
January 2013.
 vii
 The event was focused on generating media attention. Its main 
impact was through a high production value three dimensional film, beamed onto 
the façade of the House. The main speaker in the film was Bill Gates. The invitees 
were from EFIF campaign members, some celebrities, and people from the media. 
The event itself made no attempt to convey the demands of the campaign, develop 
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an engagement with a broader public, or identify a core problem that needed 
addressing beyond ‘hunger’ as a condition.  
In March, EFIF carried out a series of actions or ‘stunts’ to publicise this ‘ask’, mainly 
focussed around an intense tweet and email operation focussed on Chancellor 
George Osborne, an ‘elephant in the room’ image campaign, and a series of George 
Osborne ‘rush mobs’ in which campaigners wearing Osborne masks turned up in 
public places for photo opportunities. As a result, In April, the coalition claimed a 
success in securing a commitment to achieving 0.7% aid expenditure. However, 
because the Government did not commit to include the magic 0.7% as legislation for 
the Queen’s speech and because this commitment had been supported by Cameron 
repeatedly before the Budget, perceptions of a campaign success were muted. The 
commitment to 0.7% and a general increase in DFID expenditure had been ongoing 
since 2010. Nevertheless, in the April meeting, it was presented as a campaign 
success. 
After April, EFIF focused on the G8 meeting to be hosted by the British government. 
The G8 ‘moment’ was conceptualised as a week-long period, commencing with a 
large public assembly which aimed to coincide with Cameron’s hosting of a Nutrition 
for Growth pre-summit meeting. Following on from that date, smaller publicity 
events would keep public attention until a smaller rally took place on the 15th in 
Enniskillen to coincide with the G8 meeting. Between April and June, EFIF 
propounded its four demands to be addressed by the G8. These were: a 
commitment to 0.7% of GNP dedicated to official development assistance; a move to 
ensure international companies pay ‘fair’ levels of tax in poor countries; a halt to 
‘land grabbing’ in poor countries; transparency in development aid and practice. It is 
striking how (with the exception of land grabbing) these demands closely mirror the 
Conservative Party’s own development strategy, embedded in the golden threadviii 
notion mentioned earlier, but also Cameron’s more recent ‘three Ts’ of transparency, 
tax, and trade which had each become core parts of EFIF demands.  
Transparency and tax were foregrounded by the Conservative party at a time when 
Cameron was still centrally concerned to introduce a more socially-minded image to 
his party. This was a period when public attitudes towards government and big 
business were relatively negative. There was not only concern about the fraud and 
collusion by banks in the aftermath of the financial crisis and associated rescue 
packages; this was also a period in which large companies like Amazon, Google and 
Starbucks were revealed to be paying no or extremely little tax to the British 
government. The Tory focus on tax and transparency and its connection to a morally-
positive international development campaign addressed the bad publicity emanating 
from tax evasion within big business. 
 
The Big If 
The London ‘Big If’ rally took place on 8th June. Attendees were invited to plant a 
flower-windmill in a way that resembled a commemoration of a single death. A 
pathway from this field to a stage with band and film clips brought people into the 
main event. Geographically removed from the G8 meeting which was to take place a 
week later, the experience of the rally was complex: a mixture of expressions of 
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concern or lamentation about hunger; sociability; spectacle; and in an indirect way 
an address to next week’s meetings in Lough Erne. There was a sizable attendance 
from people who were already members of development NGOs: in a survey carried 
out by XXXX, 67 per cent of respondents identified as members of development 
organisations.ix  
The assembly at Hyde Park coincided with Cameron’s hosting of a Nutrition for 
Growth Summit which had an overlapping agenda, based in a project to address 
hunger through business and science. This was the epitome of the Conservatives’ 
DFID vision. Cameron’s summit laid heavy emphasis on the role of corporate 
technologies – this was the essence of the meaning of ‘business and science’. This 
meeting, held at Unilever House, was not mentioned throughout the day, although 
Bill Gates, the major video speaker, propounded his usual messages about the 
benefits of technology and big business.x On the 7th June EFIF staged a hand-in at 
Number 10 of empty plates by schoolchildren with ‘messages for leaders’ written on 
them which was aimed at the Nutrition for Growth summit.
xi
  
The Lough Erne G8 Declaration starts: ‘Private enterprise drives growth, reduces 
poverty, and creates jobs and prosperity for people around the world.’ It then 
proceeds to itemise an agenda that precisely overlaps with the Conservative 
international development world-vision. The media generally reported on the G8 
outcomes with an exclusive focus on Cameron, adding in some imagery of EFIF visual 
stunts of G8 leaders as chefs, or anonymous fat cats in a tax haven.xii The G8 did not 
commit to  clear and concrete measures to ensure transparency in tax reporting and 
to prevent tax evasion, something that authoritative experts stated clearly and 
critically. Nevertheless, the EFIF spokesperson spoke of a ‘step in the right direction’ 
and the ‘right ambition’.xiii  
The lose and generalised connection between the EFIF assembly and the G8 made it 
difficult to discern in any concrete way the effects of the EFIF campaign on the G8, 
especially in light of the closeness of the agenda of EFIF to Cameron’s own. Although 
EFIF campaign managers were pleased with the profile afforded to the campaign in 
the media, the content itself is less reassuring, based as it was on the association of 
campaign images with a generally government-focused and uncritical reportage on 
what were fairly moderate and vague commitments. 
A final wrap-up meeting was held in July. The main content of that meeting was an 
enthusiastically-delivered general assessment of the campaign by the Chair of the 
Policy and Advocacy Working Group which awarded gold, silver and bronze to 
general areas of the campaign’s aims. This was delivered in a very positive fashion 
but was not accompanied by any organised critical reflection. In place of this, 
attendees were invited to write on post-its and pin them to boards under different 
themes. The exact purposes of this exercise was not clear. The impression – at least 
for this attendee – was that the primary purpose was to ensure positive feelings 
about the campaign. The person reporting to the meeting on the overall 
performance of the camping declared ‘we got every single thing!’xiv It is worth 
bearing in mind that this meeting was of coalition members only; it was not 
‘outward facing’ and did not require ‘spin’ for the purposes of messaging and brand. 
In this context, it seemed clear that the meeting was driven strongly by a therapeutic 
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sense of ensuring positive closure to the campaign after the difficulties that had 
defined the period from 2006 to 2013. 
Throughout the campaign, EFIF’s policy aims were flexible and broad. They revolved 
around vague causal premises. There was no clear idea of how the campaign or 
indeed the G8 might arrest ‘land grabbing’. An emphasis on biofuels early on was de-
emphasised. The issue of tax reform rose in importance, in spite of an opaque 
causation with hunger and malnutrition which seemed to boil down to an 
expectation – naïve by any analytical standards – that increased tax revenues from 
FDI would create larger resource for investment in agriculture. Furthermore, the 
strong emphasis on smallholder farming and local technological change that came 
from early meetings and the small member organisations of the campaign was lost. 
Through the Tories and the G8, the ‘solving hunger through business and science’ 
and new Green Revolution corporate-state project garnered highly publicised 
commitments of resource.  
The fact that the campaign took care to establish campaign aims which did not 
require specific targets of achievement connected to metrics or discrete policies 
does not only raise questions about the way one might evaluate campaign success; it 
also opens up a deeper analytical question about how success and failure are 
constructed. In essence, EFIF was set up not to fail. The demands it made were 
sufficiently broad and integrated into Government initiatives as to make it possible 
to put a positive spin on practically any outcome from the G8 in terms of 
commitments to address hunger and malnutrition. The breadth, generality, and 
creeping moderation of EFIF’s demands necessarily left space for those who wished 
it to declare success. This might be considered not so much as a ‘failure’ of the 
campaign to get certain things achieved, but rather as a strategy elaborated within 
the specific conditions of the time. We will now explore other ways in which this was 
so. 
 
CONSTRUCTING SUCCESS 
Success for EFIF was framed in a specific way. The framing of success was not 
strongly oriented towards the policy achievements and resource commitments 
emanating from the campaign’s pressure on the G8 which, we have argued, was 
difficult to discern. Success in terms of G8 action was, at best, broadly implied, 
partial or affirmed rather than demonstrated. The concrete outcomes of the 
campaign were only positive in the sense of possibly leading to action by G8 states in 
areas that had already been identified by the British government as possible areas 
for action. The G8 (which saw global hunger as one issue amongst others) did not 
make strong clear commitments for action in any case. Since 2013, it is fair to say 
that those who drove the EFIF campaign have not followed up or campaigned to 
ensure that the areas of success have been realised. It is also very obvious that, to 
date, little has been achieved in reducing mass hunger and malnutrition and what 
success has been achieved can hardly be accounted for by G8 agency. 
But there was very positive affect in the wrap-up meeting which put a kind of seal on 
a campaign that had worked well enough to establish a kind of besieged modus 
operandi for coalition campaigning: strategically cautious, aware of the difficulties of 
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coalition building, and in some sense therapeutic for an NGO sector that was looking 
for a sense of renewal in hard times. Principally this message was directed towards 
those within the coalition itself. Although entirely subjective, this observer was 
struck by how much time and energy was spent in assembly meetings talking up the 
project itself in ways that seemed to border on motivational speaking. 
Enough Food If did not achieve a brand or legacy in the way that Band Aid, Jubilee 
2000, or Make Poverty History did. Even the most sympathetic reading would not 
claim that EFIF had a big impact on British government development practice. It did 
not become part of Britain’s ‘ribbon culture’ (Moore 2010).  
Although there was broad and positive media coverage of the campaign’s ‘event’ 
high spots, there was less media reporting of mission accomplished or success. There 
was no high profile media event to relate the campaign’s successes to the general 
public. The campaign coalition’s main success comes from its achievements in 
organising a campaign coalition, establishing a relationship with government, and re-
energising its existing members during a politically depressing period. This kind of 
success derived from strategic decisions made by the coalition’s managers. 
 
The EFIF campaign: short and sweet? 
The campaign itself was effectively six months long. Aware of how MPH had tailed 
off after the G8 and that coalition member commitment had waned, EFIF focused on 
the G8 summit in June and then held a wrap-up meeting for coalition members in 
July. As noted, the wrap-up meeting was overlain with a ‘success’ message which 
was not strongly evidenced and left no space for clear critical reflection. There was 
no ‘next steps’ moment either, although an evaluation consultancy was 
commissioned (Tibbett and Stalker 2014).  
The first campaign meeting was in camera. Some campaign organisations attended 
this first meeting and then left the coalition on the grounds that it reproduced the 
moderate and (in their view) apolitical strategy that came to dominate MPH.
xv
 In this 
sense EFIF had, by its first meeting open to all organisations, defined itself around 
the ‘BOAG’ NGOs and without the larger ‘radical’ NGOs. This had the effect of 
reducing the political tensions that had for a time pervaded Make Poverty History. 
The first open general assembly of EFIF (16th November 2012) commenced with 
some scene-setting addresses from those in the coordination team. There was a 
strong affective content in these addresses that aimed to produce an affirmative and 
encompassing feeling in the venue. One key speaker related how good it felt to be 
back together again, implicitly referencing the sense of break-up left by MPH. Even 
in this first general meeting, there was a strong framing of the campaign around 
what one speaker called ‘ending well’ and ‘celebrating’. This is, of course, entirely 
understandable at the start of a project to build a coalition. But, it was also 
noteworthy that there was no sense of contention (Tarrow 2005), uncertainty, 
struggle, or opposition upon which a mobilisation might be constructed. One 
representative who asked if hunger and malnutrition could be meaningfully 
addressed in the absence of demands to end the ‘war on terror’ was pointedly 
excluded, although the points he made were quite reasonable.xvi 
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Beyond the ‘0.7’, was no specific target setting, identification of a basket of specific 
policy ‘asks’ from G8 governments, or clear identification of problem of hunger. The 
four themes of investment, land, tax, and transparency were announced as the 
orientations of EFIF. As the assembly meetings proceeded and campaign material 
and activity emerged, it was clear that the evocations of the campaign were 
designed not to rely on specific, ambitious, but realistic targets in the way that MPH 
and Jubilee 2000 had been. Rather, these themes served as the aspirational focus for 
the campaign, each framed with a more or less specific cause and effect. Stop land 
grabbing to protect smallholders, invest and give aid to improve agricultural 
productivity, reduce tax avoidance to improve revenues that could be invested in 
agriculture, and make ‘governments and investors to be honest and open about the 
deals they make in the poorest countries that stop people getting enough food’.
xvii
 
These themes are presented with very vague causations, no specific demands and – 
especially in the case of the final theme – stretch a clear sense of cause and effect. 
Within assembly meetings, the coalition was theme-driven, not target-driven in 
terms of its demands. The bulk of meeting content was oriented towards the 
management of media (electronic and print) and public attitudes. As a result, the 
meetings were mainly concerned with the processes and progress of coalition 
building. The complex questions about campaign demands, and the causations 
behind hunger and malnutrition were not mooted. 
The shortness and sweetness structured into the campaign makes sense from a post-
2010 campaign recovery point-of-view; but as a way to deal with the massive and 
complex issue of hunger and malnutrition, it raises a very important issue. The 
campaign’s organisation and duration made it constitutively unable to address global 
malnutrition and hunger in any meaningful fashion. The core issues relating to 
hunger and malnutrition are at least as complex as those of international debt, 
apartheid, and slavery and in each of those campaign areas, coalitions endured for 
years and even generations. There is no amount of campaign success that can be 
compressed into a six-month period that would come close to addressing global 
hunger and malnutrition in any meaningful sense.  
EFIF was a coalition that was sensitive to the plurality of its coalition members but, in 
the absence of the larger ‘radical’ NGOs, it worked through the larger and well-
resourced mainstream development NGOs. EFIF was both inclusive, open-ended, not 
tied to any specific achievements, and de facto dominated by the large campaign 
organisations. It was designed in a strictly time-constrained fashion that ensured it 
did not collapse or lose energy. It worked well in generating a campaign coalition but 
far less so as a vehicle to identify clear targets and exacting actions attached to them.  
 
Adjusting expectations 
Ensuring success also required the construction of a strong policy and vision overlap 
with government. The absence of contentious or adversarial content in the 
campaign would make it highly likely that the campaign could be broadly positive 
about government actions and, as a result, narrate the campaign as having had a 
positive effect on government action. 
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During the first open assembly meeting – and repeated throughout subsequent 
meetings – a message was related that the Conservative government was amenable 
to EFIF and that there was a real window of opportunity for the campaign. In the 
words of the Chair of the Policy and Advocacy Working Group, Cameron was ‘saying 
some really good stuff.’ This framing effectively removed the notion of an adverse 
political environment from the campaign. One might suppose that NGO campaigns 
often tag onto larger and more ‘official’ and governmental initiatives (Hilton et al. 
2013), but in this case the window of opportunity afforded by the moments from the 
Olympic ‘summit’ to the G8 meeting was narrow indeed and no explicit reflection on 
this fact or the dangers of attaching hope to a political party strongly wedded to 
neoliberal values can be found in any of the materials from the campaign or the 
discussions within the assembly meetings.  
The major NGOs in BOND were meeting with senior members of the Conservative 
and Liberal Democrat parties as soon as possible after the election victory. In this 
period, Cameron’s strategy for the Tories was based in what were at the time judged 
to be relatively ‘liberal’ political ideas, revolving around wellbeing and the ‘big 
society’. The Conservatives were also well aware that a certain kind of presentation 
of international development had worked well for New Labour as a way to represent 
a political aesthetic of national grandeur and moral purpose. Positive signals about 
international development offered a fairly straightforward way to address the issue 
coined by now-Prime Minister Theresa May, of being perceived as the ‘nasty party’.  
There was, in effect, a mutual desire by major campaign groups and the new 
coalition government, to find a cohabitation within which both could claim a moral 
virtue as progressive development actors, and an agenda was discovered to enable 
this comity. ‘Hunger’ was the venue within which this was achieved. David Cameron 
articulated his ‘golden threads’ of development: ‘stable government, lack of 
corruption, human rights, the rule of law, transparent information’. The campaign 
coalition interpreted this core directive within Cameron’s declared development 
vision as positive and fairly easy to work with. One ca  readily see how it maps quite 
extensively onto the four themes of EFIF. In none of the meetings I attended was 
Cameron’s golden thread notion articulated in a critical fashion, in spite of its 
obvious ideological and neoliberal facets.  
Cameron generated a strong formulation of both problem and solution in regards to 
hunger that fulsomely fitted with a liberal and globalist Conservative worldview in 
which well-meaning transnational corporations, supported by governments and 
amenable scientists, would disseminate technologies, techniques, and financial 
mechanisms that would engineer peasant households into petty entrepreneurs able 
to upscale their own well-being. This agenda went under the rubric ‘solving 
malnutrition and hunger through business and science’. The ‘science’ part of this 
phrasing effectively meant corporately-owned technologies such as improved seeds, 
fertilisers, and pesticides.  
EFIF reconciled itself to this vision. It invited Bill Gates to speak at its event and it did 
not make any strong critical statements of Cameron’s vision for solving hunger. EFIF 
‘wished the leaders well’ in their meetings. Beyond the main stage performances, 
the main event was the planting of a field of ‘windmill’ flowers to represent the 
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number of children who died from malnutrition, an event that could hardly have 
been more apolitical.  
As the G8 event approached, the campaign’s messages on hunger and malnutrition 
and the those of the Government came to overlap. Cameron’s explicitly pro-business, 
technocratic, and financialised model of change was devised within his government, 
did not change, and was announced as the agenda for his leadership of the G8. It 
was accompanied by a broad and open-ended EFIF coalition which was based on 
thematic overlaps with government, broad aspirations rather than demands, and a 
lack of critical positions on the Conservatives’ vision of development. These 
properties ensured that any outcomes from the G8 could feasibly look like success. 
In sum, 2013 saw EFIF briefly generate an effective international development 
coalition in the teeth of inter-organisational trepidation and a broader political 
environment defined by austerity and a shift to the Right in UK governance. 
Inasmuch as one judges EFIF a success in managing a coalition that worked and did 
not generate a problematic legacy, one has also to understand its failure to make 
any kind of ‘historic’ progress in regards to hunger and malnutrition.  
 
CONCLUSION: POST-WRISTBAND BLUES 
The EFIF campaign can be understood as a response by development NGOs to a 
particularly challenging environment. In the teeth of a shift to the Right and a 
recession, NGOs set out a coalition that had as its primary aim establishing the 
beginnings of a modus vivendi in a new period. This did not translate a great deal 
into new, strong, and ambitious campaign demands.xviii But, its success can be 
identified in its more internalised focus on making campaign coalitions based in a 
relationship with government possible. This explains why the  organisation of the 
campaign was based in broad thematic aspirations that enjoyed a substantial 
overlap with Government agendas that were devised by-and-large independently 
from the development NGOs. It also explains why the campaign itself was highly 
time-constrained, generalised, and articulated in ways that did not expect specific 
outcome ‘wins’.  
But, there is a downside to this. EFIF’s legacy is slender indeed. It’s public visibility 
was not sufficiently strong to create a ‘historic’ brand in the way that Jubilee 2000 
and Make Poverty History did. In the midst of the moderate financial commitments 
of the G8 and the modality through which the ‘hunger issue’ is addressed by the 
corporate-state nexus EFIF did not collate a clear set of policies, demands, or 
political values to make a distinct contribution. The most obvious way in which they 
could have done this would have been through some evocation of the notion of 
‘food sovereignty’, but this term was closely associated with the more radical 
campaign NGOs who removed themselves from the campaign. Food sovereignty 
would also have generated clear light between the campaign coalition and the 
Government. Contrastingly, one EFIF activity involved asking schoolchildren to write 
a message to David Cameron about hunger on a plate. This led to a very nice photo 
opportunity for Cameron on 7
th
 June to pose outside Number Ten with a selection of 
kids and accompanied by David Walliams.  
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Individual development NGOs in the UK remain active and intellectually ambitious. 
Many of the leading NGOs in the EFIF coalition have ‘radical’ campaign foci that 
resemble the kinds of values associated with the food sovereignty movement or 
other radical campaign positions. This is not an argument that development 
campaigning is headed for the dustbin of history. What EFIF reveals is that there is a 
strategic tension between the desire for success and the risks of demanding 
ambitious change. In regards to the latter, it is difficult to see what prospects there 
are for large campaign coalitions that focus mainly on big intergovernmental 
summitry.   
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i See for example http://www.oxfam.org.uk/media-centre/press-
releases/2013/05/make-poverty-history-and-g8-promises-was-it-all-really-worth-it.  
ii
 There were – and there remain – diverging views on the outcomes of the G8. There 
was a generally positive note concerning the commitments to write off debt to 
highly indebted countries and to commit to increases in aid up to $50bn by 2010. 
There was debate concerning whether this was enough, or whether it would be 
effective in reducing global poverty significantly. There was some confusion 
concerning the relation between debt write-off and aid commitment. Regarding the 
third issue, trade justice, there was a more concerted disappointment amongst 
campaign organisations. 
iii By the 2007 G8 meeting at Heiligendamm, many NGOs considered the G8 to have 
failed to commit fully to the 2005 outcomes.  
iv Although I will dispense with the quotation marks, it is important to note that the 
notion of hunger is a heavily constructed political term more than it is a specific 
calorific requirement. In the UK, it’s normative content and the kinds of identities it 
produces have tended to gravitate towards the charitable image of the famine victim. 
This concern that hunger evoked old-fashioned charitable appeals was expressed on 
numerous occasions during the EFIF coalition meetings. 
v
 The BOAG (big overseas aid group) Chief Executives met with David Cameron 
before EFIF was commenced (notes from coalition meeting, 16th November 2012). 
BOAG consists of ActionAid, Oxfam, CAFOD, Save the Children and Christian Aid. 
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vi The BOAG campaign NGOs had been meeting informally since mid 2011. The 
author attended general assembly planning meetings throughout 2012 and 2013. 
Much of the information in this section derives from the notes of those meetings. 
vii The author attended this launch meeting. 
viii
 Like many of Cameron’s attempts to disseminate ‘big ideas’, the golden thread 
notion was rather opaque and not especially prominent. In Cameron’s words: ‘you 
only get real long-term development through aid if there is also a golden thread of 
stable government, lack of corruption, human rights, the rule of law, transparent 
information.’ One can see that this fits with the ‘three Ts’ and with facets of the EFIF 
agenda. 
ix
 N=476. The coalition expected 30,000 to attend, and some estimates were as high 
as 40,000. This did not reflect my own observations. The survey team distributed 
3,000 surveys through a purposive sampling of one in ten and covered the entire 
field. 
x Bill Gates’ relation to international development campaigning is controversial and, 
in the context of this article, revealing. See McGoey (2015). 
xi The Nutrition for Growth summit was protested by NGOs which had decided not to 
participate in EFIF. 
xii This is clear from EFIF’s own collating of G8 media coverage. 
xiii From The Guardian and The Telegraph respectively, both June 18th.  
xiv From research notes of the meeting held on 5th July. 
xv Notably here: War on Want and Global Justice Now (formerly World Development 
Movement). 
xvi The relationship between war and hunger is a common theme within livelihoods 
and famine research. See for example Keen (2008) Macrae and Zwi (1994) 
xvii Taken from http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/2013-01/enough-food-everyone-
if. I have directly quoted this last theme because it is difficult to paraphrase in a clear 
or concise fashion. I am not sure what it means. 
xviii It is worth noting that a broadly-read reflection on MPH that argued for the 
construction of ‘positive deep frames’ was absent throughout the campaign 
(Darnton and Kirk 2011). See also Hampson 2006. 
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Post-wristband Blues: the Mixed Fortunes of UK Development Campaigning under 
austerity and the Conservatives. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
2005 witnessed the rolling out of the Make Poverty History development campaign 
coalition. The general, but not unanimous, view was that Make Poverty History 
(MPH) made tangible headway on many of its demands. Member NGOs generally 
declared the campaign a success and the celebrity advocates that grabbed media 
attention spoke about historic victories. Seen in retrospect, this moment of success 
seems rather bathetic, the last great hurrah of a campaign logic that subsequently 
fell into abeyance. From 2006 onwards, individual campaign organisations each 
made a quieter and less celebratory post-mortem of the 2005 moment before 
returning to organisation-specific campaigning.i  
There was a general understanding that large collaborative campaigns were unlikely 
to happen again and that some damage to its prospects had been wrought by the 
Make Poverty History  campaign. As a result of economic recession from 2008, the 
meta-narrative of British politics shifted to crisis and austerity. In 2010, New Labour 
was replaced by a coalition government of Conservative and Liberal Democrat, in 
which the latter were dominant. This election outcome removed a key institutional 
relationship that development campaigners had come to rely on: a ruling party that 
shared many of the development norms of the campaign organisations themselves. 
Nevertheless, in 2013, a major national development campaign coalition was once 
again devised: the Enough Food If campaign (EFIF). This article explores the 
motivations and strategies that underpinned the construction of a campaign 
coalition in such adverse circumstances. The first section sets out the difficult legacy 
left by Make Poverty History before proceeding in the second section to consider the 
changed environment within which EFIF emerged. The third section looks at EFIF in 
some detail, paying particular attention to the ways in which it faced both the MPH 
legacy and the new political environment. The fourth section sets out an argument 
that the major logic of the campaign was to lock in a success narrative from 
beginning to end, over and above other strategic campaign aims, and in this sense to 
shake off the post-wristband blues of its time. Finally, the article concludes. 
 
THE ROAD TO 2015 
The Make Poverty History effect 
Make Poverty History was, in a sense, the best of times and the worst of times for 
development campaigning. Its most convincing success was its ability to mobilise 
some level of awareness and engagement from large numbers of people. Reportedly, 
as many as eight million white wristbands were worn. The support base of the 
coalition expanded massively, a base that was also designed to give supporters an 
opportunity to ‘migrate’ into a specific campaign organisation. The demonstrations 
around the Gleneagles G8 Summit and media impact of the Live 8 concerts 
generated moments of media saturation in which it was difficult for anyone to avoid 
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the campaign. The level of cultural endorsement from celebrities, media, and 
politicians was exceptional.  
These features might be considered as intrinsic victories, ones that relate to the aims 
of campaigning itself: public mobilisation, the growth of campaign organisations, the 
legitimation of their purposes. One can also argue that the campaign’s extrinsic 
purposes were achieved to a considerable degree. That is, the policy objectives of 
the campaign were largely met.ii The G8 Summit led to commitments to aid and debt 
reduction which, for some campaign coalition members, demonstrated the success 
of MPH. Within the campaign, people had different expectations of what ‘success’ 
might mean, but many – especially from the larger organisations – considered the 
outcomes to be positive, at least in regards to aid and debt. The dominant metaphor 
at the time was that a mountain had successfully been climbed but that this revealed 
other peaks in the near distance.  
However, this metaphor was itself a symptom of the fact that MPH was not an 
absolute success. The G8 would not make poverty history in any tangible sense. The 
campaign messages throughout 2004-5 relayed a sense of epochal temporality: 
making history by making poverty history;  a momentous year in which the direction 
of the future of poverty was to be decided by ‘eight men in a room’. The campaign 
logic was that this was a ‘now or never’ moment. The fact that, especially  after July, 
the campaign presented to the public a victory that would not make poverty history 
but rather offer a significant step forward over the next few years if the G8 leaders 
honoured their commitments generated significant anxiety within the coalition in 
terms of expectation management and the extent to which the G8 had the political 
will to fulfil its commitments as the years passed.iii  
Furthermore, for some coalition members, the commitments were not worth 
celebrating; a ‘whisper’ rather than a ‘roar’ (Abugre 2005). The commitments of the 
G8 were seen as not equal to the task of mass poverty reduction, and the 
commitments that were made did not modify prevailing neoliberal development 
practices and ideologies. As the campaign progressed towards the G8, some 
coalition members had become so concerned about the closeness of the campaign 
to New Labour that they left the coalition, judging that both the politics of the 
campaign and the ability of New Labour to use it to boost their own legitimacy made 
it effectively morally and politically bankrupt (Hodkinson 2005). Reports seeped out 
as the year went on of considerable disagreement within the coalition.  
As a result, as the dust settled on a campaign that ostensibly lasted a year but was all 
but over by August, the public celebration of ‘mission accomplished’ dissolved into a 
rather complicated, diffuse, and dour ratcheting down of the coalition as each 
member reflected on the pros and cons of the endeavour and moved back into their 
own silos with both positive and negative lessons from the coalition. 
From 2005 to 2010, development NGOs maintained low-level networking and 
information sharing, mainly through BOND (British Overseas NGOs for Development), 
the organisational hub for development NGOs. The NGOs continued to work within a 
context that was still underpinned by a positive relationship between the larger 
NGOs and the New Labour government. In other words, the fall-out of MPH was in 
some degree calibrated by a government that remained positively-disposed to the 
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mainstream development campaigning project. As a result, it was relatively easy for 
large NGOs to transition out of MPH. Indeed, some took aspects of MPH’s imagery 
and discourse into their own unilateral campaigns and maintained the kinds of 
working relations with government that were at the heart of MPH. This kind of 
transition was enjoyed mainly by the large NGOs that led the campaign, especially 
Oxfam, Christian Aid, Action Aid, CAFOD and Save the Children UK. A second distinct 
group (notably War on Want and World Development Movement, now Global 
Justice Now) spent this time moving into a more explicitly ‘social movement’ frame 
which was considerably more cynical about New Labour.  
In retrospect, the five years after 2005 look like the six years before 2005. There was 
a ruling party with an ideology that was sympathetic to the core norms of the 
development campaign NGO community; there was a well-institutionalised and 
resourced NGO sector in which each organisation had its membership, institutional 
specificities, and networks; there were a series of organisation-specific campaign 
issues that generated advocacy and fund raising in specific development areas 
(Porteous 2008:12, 19).  
 
International development, NGOs and New Labour 
New Labour’s relationship with the development campaign community defines this 
period. The Labour party had campaign, social, and ideological roots in 
internationalism and Third Worldism (Howe 1993). This is evident in its Fabian 
politics, its connections with anti-apartheid (Bush 1999: 248 et seq., Fieldhouse 2005, 
Vickers 2011), its links with labour unions that had solidarity connections with post-
colonial unions and movements, and with socially-progressive church organisations. 
From 1997, New Labour condensed these variegated developmentalist associations 
into a strong normative discourse around ethics and virtue in international relations 
and development (Gallagher 2011); one component of New Labour’s international 
development ethics was partnerships with development NGOs.  
New Labour understood international development in what might be broadly 
glossed as progressively liberal. Good governance, development partnership, 
capabilities approaches, civil society and NGOs, and a socially-progressive market-
based economy were the pivots of New Labour’s vision of a development future. The 
UK’s development NGOs fitted well into this vision as providers of resources, good 
development partners, and friends of civil society. Both Government and NGOs 
shared a strong desire to galvanise a pro-development constituency within the 
British public (Biccum 2007, Manzo 2006). New Labour channelled significant 
amounts of official development assistance through selected NGOs. It invested in 
both research and public relations to promote the construction of a form of 
knowledge based in a revived, ethical, and effective aid project in which UK NGOs 
played a pivotal role. The creation and political focus on DFID embodied New 
Labour’s developmental intentions. From its origins, DFID took on something of a 
campaign role itself: its foundational statement of intent Building Support for 
Development, could easily have been on a major campaign NGO’s website. Arch 
celebrity campaigner Bono spoke at New Labour’s 2004 party conference; Bob 
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Geldof was asked by Blair to act as a celebrity-advocate for the Africa Commission 
(Street 2012).  
This comity between development NGOs and New Labour was the political context 
within which the rise and fall of MPH was managed, and it came to an end in 2010. 
In the next section, we will map out the salient political changes that took place after 
2010. We present these changes as a context within which another campaign 
coalition emerged in 2013. Bearing in mind how inauspicious the circumstances were 
for a post-MPH campaign coalition, we need to explore the features of the campaign 
not only on their own terms but also as a response to a generally rather depressing 
state of affairs for international development campaigning. Seen in this light, the 
Enough Food If campaign is best understood as an attempt to re-define a modus 
operandi and vivendi for development NGOs in a context significantly transformed 
from that of the previous thirteen years. 
 
NEW GOVERNMENT 
It is important to start with a note of moderation. It is not the case that the coming 
to power of the Coalition government (or indeed the subsequent Conservative 
government) represented any kind of totalising counter-revolution in development 
policy (Clarke 2018: 25). Indeed, for many analysts on the Left, the short history of 
Blair’s New Labour and David Cameron’s Conservatism was one of substantial 
convergence. Both in terms of public image, leadership style, and substantive areas 
of policy strategy, New Labour and Conservative policy shared a great deal in regards 
to development and aid.  
New Labour reconciled itself to a non-socialist and broadly liberal policy agenda, 
based in a faith that private business and socially-beneficial competition would 
address the core concerns of the party: inequality and poverty (Porteous 2008). 
Within this intellectual framing, international aid was largely articulated within a 
neoliberal framework. One could see this in the Africa Commission Report (2005), a 
report which fed into the Government’s preparations for the G8 and engagement 
with MPH (Brown 2006). DFID also embraced a vision of development through 
support for competitive market-based growth and the facilitating of a positive role 
for transnational corporations and unconstrained markets: making globalisation 
work for the poor (Cammack 2001).  
In 2010, the Conservative party publically affirmed that it would commit to the 0.7% 
GNP aid target which was previously a key aspiration of New Labour. Making this 
commitment publically allowed the Tories a fairly cheap means of brand 
decontamination (Heppell and Lightfoot 2012), emerging as it was from a public 
image of sleaze and self-interest. Cameron’s Big Society, ‘golden thread’ in 
development, and quality of life conceptual orientations also fed into a development 
vision that was moderately distinct but substantially similar to New Labour’s. 
Cameron encapsulated this concisely himself in his ideological orientation away from 
One Nation Conservatism to One World Conservatism (Noxolo 2012: 33), calling the 
British aid the ‘best in the world’ (Clarke 2018: 24). Both parties’ orientations 
regarding international development were fundamentally based in what Brown 
(2009) calls the ‘liberal bargain’ of international aid: a vision of good governance, 
Page 22 of 38The British Journal of Politics and International Relations
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review
 O
nly
open economies, competitive markets, and a faith that liberal political sociability 
would spread unproblematically into poor societies if all of the former components 
were in place.  
The international component of Cameron’s premiership also supported his advocacy 
of a global neoliberal developmentalism. He accepted Ban Ki-moon’s invitation to co-
Chair a UN High Level Panel on the post Millennium Development Goals (Seldon and 
Snowden 2015: 481). The post-MDG planning got under way from 2010 as the 
Coalition came to power and it was built on a sustained intergovernmental 
institutionalisation of development and aid governance that commenced with the 
Monterrey Consensus of 2002 (Wickstead 2015: 49 et seq.) and within which DFID 
had been a key player. The international aid and development architecture 
constructed throughout the new millennium provided a context within which any 
internationally-focused leader within a broadly neoliberal ideological disposition 
would find it amenable to continue this project, much in the same way as broader 
contexts of left/social democracy tend to promote favourable attitudes towards 
development aid (Chaney 2013, Therien and Noel 2000). 
Thus, there was no great shift in international development thinking by the Coalition 
government. But, this did not mean that nothing changed. In the first place, 
development campaign organisations were now faced with a political party that had 
been culturally and ideologically distant from it. Few Conservative MPs considered 
international development as a major policy issue and, compared with New Labour, 
there was a weaker pro-aid constituency. Development NGOs simply did not have 
good advocacy networks with Conservative MPs. All of the celebrity advocates 
within the campaign NGO sector were broadly on the left and culturally anti-Tory. 
The NGOs’ policy positions on things like trade, climate change, and transnationals 
were clearly more distant from Tory views than they were under New Labour for all 
of the convergence at the heart of policy. This new environment was uncertain and 
potentially adversarial. 
The Conservative party in Parliament and parts of its broader membership were 
ideologically hostile to international development campaigning values, which had 
been constructed out of a Fabian, socialist, and social-democratic Christian bundle of 
values. This broader disposition – of overseas development aid being associated with 
“liberal” and left-leaning politics – was virulently reinforced through the Right-wing 
press connected to groups within the party, a fact that the Tory leadership were well 
aware of (Cawley 2015 :547). The Conservative Party is, of course, a kind of coalition 
itself. One of the divisions within Parliament is between a ‘hard’ insular nationalism 
that Thatcher encapsulated, and a more globalist neoliberalism that Cameron 
certainly cleaved to. Within the Party, Cameron constantly had to manage a 
politically virulent opposition to his global neoliberalism, something that was most 
obvious in regards to the lightning rod that was the commitment to spend 0.7% of 
GDP on aid (Clarke 2018: 26-27). In response to pressure to abandon the 0.7% 
commitment, Cameron commented  ‘we won’t make any new friends by dropping it’, 
a phrasing that suggests that he was reconciled to a degree of Parliamentary 
opposition however he acted, something that connects well with his attitude 
towards Eurosceptics within his own party after the MP rebellion in October 2011 
(Shipman 2016: 7). It was at this point that the term ‘dinosaurs’ became currency to 
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describe a Eurosceptic, anti gay marriage, and also anti-aid corpus within the party 
which Cameron consistently opposed. 
Furthermore, in some ways, the Conservatives have shifted international 
development strategy, although this has not been as publicised as perhaps it should 
be. The core shift has been away from good governance and partnerships with aid 
recipient states which was at the very heart of New Labour’s strategy. In its place 
there is a far stronger focus on private companies as key development partners 
(Mawdsley 2015). The Conservative government has consolidated an aid model 
based in the contracting of private companies. This was present during the New 
Labour administration (Taylor 2012: 454), but there is also a more clear strategic 
orientation by the Conservatives to present private companies as ‘developmental’. 
And, large amounts of DFID expenditure go on private company services. These 
trends are extant in the sectoral spending of official development assistance away 
from DFID and into other government departments (Manji and Cullen 2016). 
The increasing centrality of private companies in aid strategy goes beyond payments 
to contracted private enterprises. Aid strategy has, in a sense, been “corporatised” in 
that the kinds of knowledge and skills that private companies claim to have are 
perceived as part of the international aid strategy itself. One can see this most 
clearly in the new green revolution for Africa (AGRA) (Kaarhus 2011) in which 
companies are expected to train, provide services, and contribute to the 
reorganisation of smallholder agriculture. One can also see it in the providing of 
technological and infrastructural services by large transnationals. Discrete projects 
to promote microfinance, communications technology connectivity, the introduction 
of new seeds, and training all involve private corporations as service providers, 
knowledge holders, and aid recipients. The Conservative approach to development is 
more concertedly ‘corporate’ in that business is seen as a direct agent for the 
promotion of development, not just a source of capital which, according to most 
economic models (and subject to the right policy environment), generate 
developmental effects. We shall come back to this strategic reorientation later more 
specifically in regards to EFIF’s concern with hunger and malnutrition. 
The direction of movement under the Tories was concertedly towards a model of 
funding private companies directly to do development work and in the process 
celebrating this sector as the driver of change. The refocusing of aid away from 
humanitarian and solidarity norms towards value for money and business case 
norms might have served to mollify some within the Party who were sceptical of 
Cameron’s commitment to an international development agenda. Inasmuch as this is 
the case, it posed a challenge to NGOs who had customarily focussed around the 
activities of NGO, civil society, and partner government initiatives. Thus, from 2010, 
NGOs were faced with a campaign sector context defined by a difficult post-MPH 
legacy and a new and ostensibly less amenable government.  
And, of course, the shift in the British party system roughly overlapped with the 
global economic crisis. This fed into the NGO sector in a way familiar to other 
economic crisis moments previously: it generated a concern that fiscal austerity 
would impact upon the aid budget, that rising unemployment and stagnant 
disposable incomes would reduce charitable donations, and that the general public 
mood would shift against aid because of a concern for the poor ‘at home’. The rise of 
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UKIP was explicitly based in arguments about massively reducing or abolishing aid, 
laced with barely-disguised racism. The discourse of austerity that emerged after the 
financial crisis generated an increased questioning of the value of aid expenditure. 
Indeed, there was evidence that a majority of Britons did not favour ring-fencing the 
0.7% commitment (Heinrich, Kobayashi and Bryant 2011: 68, 74). 
Nevertheless Cameron’s endorsement of ‘One World’ Conservatism opened the 
door very slightly to a new working relation between international development 
NGOs and the government. Against some currents within his own party and 
somewhat against the austerity narrative his party enthusiastically embraced in most 
areas, Cameron’s leadership identified overseas development assistance as a 
diagnostic of its social conscience. This rather marginal and protean development 
within the Tories is vital to understanding the emergence of EFIF. 
 
ENOUGH FOOD IF 
 
A window of opportunity 
Campaign coalitions offer an opportunity to understand the nature of campaigning 
in a way that is especially revealing. Most obviously, one can explore the dynamics of 
relations between individual campaign organisations because they are having to 
work together formally as part of a single political project. Secondly, the campaign 
coalition itself requires co-ordination, all manner of dialogue, the construction of a 
shared discourse, and the establishing of an institution that manages, leads, and co-
ordinates the efforts of individual NGOs. Thirdly, campaign coalitions’ core purpose 
is to create a high-publicity action that strongly and publically engages with 
government or other official development agencies. This is a kind of 
“representational” economy of scale. As such, campaign coalitions offer a revealing 
way to explore the place of individual development campaigns within a broader 
British polity and public space. It is in this light that we shall explore the Enough Food 
If campaign of 2013. EFIF emerged shortly after the changes outlined in the previous 
section, a fact that raises key questions concerning the ability of development NGOs 
to negotiate an ostensibly more adversarial and austere terrain.  
The Enough Food IF campaign became a coalition of over 200 NGOs, oriented around 
issues of global hunger and malnutrition. In 2012, David Cameron hosted a post-
Olympics Hunger Summit in 2012, a ‘summit’ that was largely a 
celebrity/sportsperson-endorsed expression of concern about global hunger, 
claiming that this would be a major international issue for the Government leading 
into its hosting of the G8 the subsequent year. This was a key marker of Cameron’s 
own commitment to neoliberal internationalism. ONE and Save the Children 
attended and the summit spoke warmly about Cameron’s commitment. The EFIF 
coalition identified this moment as the ‘open door’ through which Britain’s 
development NGOs might find a revived role in the new political environment. It 
marked an opportunity for major development campaign NGOs: a statement of 
government openness to campaigning and a high-profile event in which ‘hunger’
iv
 
would be a prominent focus. 
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The large development NGOs with strong lobbying abilities have always sought the 
ear of politicians. This was the case after MPH when these NGOs sought an audience 
with Gordon Brown (and him with them) when he became Prime Minister; and it 
was also the case when the Conservative Party came to power.v The purpose of 
these informal  contacts was to secure a certain common ground between the 
Government’s agenda for the G8 and the kinds of campaign goals that the 
development NGO sector might advocate. There was a symbiosis here in which a 
ruling party enjoyed a ‘halo effect’ from publically supporting aspects of 
development NGOs’ campaigns, and NGOs could make claims to success based in 
expectations that some of their ‘asks’ are informally assured as amenable to the 
government.  
Thus, it seems reasonable to identify the beginnings of the EFIF coalition in 2012 
when some NGOs were speaking with each other informally and also in 
communication with the government, all around the notion of hunger which had 
been identified as a strong starting position for ‘detoxifying’ the Conservative Party. 
A broad agenda that would reflect a development coalition’s common interests and 
also have a reasonable chance of being supported in part by the UK government 
could serve as a starting point for coalition building in earnest.  
In October 2012, a BOND Annual General Meeting was held in which plans for a 
coalition around food and hunger to focus on the G8 were mooted. At this point, a 
group of prominent and relatively radical NGOs chose to remove themselves from 
the coalition, expressing concerns about the focus on hunger and the apparent lack 
of adversarialism concerning the Conservative-dominated government (interviews 
War on Want, Jubilee Debt Coalition).  
 
Finding common cause 
From November 2012 onwards, EFIF Assembly meetings rolled out a series of actions 
to focus mainly on the UK-hosted G8 in June 2013.
vi
 Member NGOs reported on their 
own actions, and the Organising Committee (OC) members shared information 
about the broader strategy for the UK budget and the G8 ‘moments’. A set of four 
core themes related to hunger were set out:  tax, aid, land, and transparency. These 
four were partly as the outcome of talks with Cameron, and partly broad and 
inclusive enough to ensure successful coalition building as early meetings attempted 
to draw diverse organisations in. 
The EFIF campaign was publically launched at Somerset House, London, on the 23rd 
January 2013. vii The event was focused on generating media attention. Its main 
impact was through a high production value three dimensional film, beamed onto 
the façade of the House. The main speaker in the film was Bill Gates. The invitees 
were from EFIF campaign members, some celebrities, and people from the media. 
The event itself made no attempt to convey the demands of the campaign, develop 
an engagement with a broader public, or identify a core problem that needed 
addressing beyond ‘hunger’ as a condition. It was, at its core, a means to generate a 
motivated and aspirational coalition rather than a public awareness launch. 
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In March, EFIF carried out a series of actions or ‘stunts’ to publicise its tax ‘ask’, 
focused on the persistence of tax havens. This focussed around an intense tweet and 
email operation, an ‘elephant in the room’ image campaign, and a series of George 
Osborne ‘rush mobs’ in which campaigners wearing Osborne masks turned up in 
public places for photo opportunities. Additionally, in April, the EFIF coalition 
claimed a success in securing a commitment to achieving 0.7% aid expenditure. 
However, because the Government did not commit to include the magic 0.7% as 
legislationviii for the Queen’s speech and because this commitment had been 
supported by Cameron repeatedly before the Budget, perceptions of a campaign 
success were muted. The commitment to 0.7% and a general increase in DFID 
expenditure had been ongoing since 2010. Nevertheless, in the April meeting, it was 
presented as a campaign success. 
After April, EFIF focused on the G8 meeting to be hosted by the British government. 
The G8 ‘moment’ was conceptualised as a week-long period, commencing with a 
large public assembly which aimed to coincide with Cameron’s hosting of a Nutrition 
for Growth pre-summit meeting. Following on from that date, smaller publicity 
events would keep public attention until a smaller rally took place on the 15th in 
Enniskillen to coincide with the G8 meeting. Between April and June, EFIF 
propounded its four demands to be addressed by the G8. These were: a legislated 
commitment to 0.7% of GNP dedicated to official development assistance; a move to 
ensure international companies pay ‘fair’ levels of tax in poor countries; a halt to 
‘land grabbing’ in poor countries; transparency in development aid and practice. It is 
striking how (with the exception of land grabbing) these demands closely mirror the 
Conservative Party’s own development strategy, embedded in the golden threadix 
notion mentioned earlier, but also Cameron’s more recent ‘three Ts’ of transparency, 
tax, and trade which had each become core parts of EFIF demands.  
Transparency and tax were foregrounded by the Conservative party at a time when 
Cameron was still centrally concerned to introduce a more socially-minded image to 
his party. This was a period when public attitudes towards government and big 
business were relatively negative. There was not only concern about the fraud and 
collusion by banks in the aftermath of the financial crisis and associated rescue 
packages; this was also a period in which large companies like Amazon, Google and 
Starbucks were revealed to be paying no or extremely little tax to the British 
government. The Tory focus on tax and transparency and its connection to a morally-
positive international development campaign addressed the bad publicity emanating 
from tax evasion within big business. 
 
The Big If 
The London ‘Big If’ rally took place on 8th June. Attendees were invited to plant a 
flower-windmill in a way that resembled a commemoration of a single death from 
hunger. A pathway from this field to a stage with band and film clips brought people 
into the main event. Geographically removed from the G8 meeting which was to 
take place a week later, or the Cameron pre-G8 summit, the experience of the rally 
was complex: a mixture of expressions of concern or lamentation about hunger; 
sociability; spectacle; and in an indirect way an address to next week’s meetings in 
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Lough Erne. There was a sizable attendance from people who were already members 
of development NGOs: in a survey carried out by XXXX, 67 per cent of respondents 
identified as members of development organisations.
x
  
The assembly at Hyde Park coincided with Cameron’s hosting of a Nutrition for 
Growth Summit which had an overlapping agenda, based in a project to address 
hunger through business and science. This was the epitome of the Conservatives’ 
DFID vision. Cameron’s summit laid heavy emphasis on the role of corporate 
technologies – this was the essence of the meaning of ‘business and science’. This 
meeting, held at Unilever House, was not mentioned throughout the day, although 
Bill Gates, the major video speaker, propounded his usual messages about the 
benefits of technology and big business.xi On the 7th June EFIF staged a hand-in at 
Number 10 of empty plates by schoolchildren with ‘messages for leaders’ written on 
them which was aimed at the Nutrition for Growth summit.xii  
The Lough Erne G8 Declaration starts: ‘Private enterprise drives growth, reduces 
poverty, and creates jobs and prosperity for people around the world.’ It then 
proceeds to itemise an agenda that precisely overlaps with the Conservative 
neoliberal development world-vision. The media generally reported on the G8 
outcomes with an exclusive focus on Cameron: there was very little media attention 
paid to EFIF beyond some unexplained imagery of EFIF visual stunts of G8 leaders as 
chefs, or anonymous fat cats in a tax haven.xiii The G8 did not commit to  clear and 
concrete measures to ensure transparency in tax reporting and to prevent tax 
evasion, something that authoritative experts stated clearly and critically. 
Nevertheless, the EFIF spokesperson spoke of a ‘step in the right direction’ and the 
‘right ambition’.xiv  
The lose and generalised connection between the EFIF assembly and the G8 made it 
difficult to discern in any concrete way the effects of the EFIF campaign on the G8, 
especially in light of the closeness of the agenda of EFIF to Cameron’s own. Although 
EFIF campaign managers were pleased with the profile afforded to the campaign in 
the media, the content itself is less reassuring, based as it was on the association of 
campaign images with a generally government-focused and uncritical reportage on 
what were fairly moderate and vague commitments. 
A final wrap-up meeting was held in July. The main content of that meeting was an 
enthusiastically-delivered general assessment of the campaign by the Chair of the 
Policy and Advocacy Working Group which awarded gold, silver and bronze to 
general areas of the campaign’s aims. This was delivered in a very positive fashion 
and was not accompanied by any organised critical reflection. In place of this, 
attendees were invited to write on post-its and pin them to boards under different 
themes. The exact purposes of this exercise was not clear. The impression – at least 
for this attendee – was that the primary purpose was to ensure positive feelings 
about the campaign. The person reporting to the meeting on the overall 
performance of the camping declared ‘we got every single thing!’xv It is worth 
bearing in mind that this meeting was of coalition members only; it was not 
‘outward facing’ and did not require ‘spin’ for the purposes of messaging and brand. 
In this context, it seemed clear that the meeting was driven strongly by a therapeutic 
sense of ensuring positive closure to the campaign after the difficulties that had 
defined the period from 2006 to 2013. 
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Throughout the campaign, EFIF’s policy aims were flexible and broad. They revolved 
around vague causal premises. There was no clear idea of how the campaign or 
indeed the G8 might arrest ‘land grabbing’. An early emphasis on biofuels early on 
was de-emphasised. The issue of tax reform rose in importance, in spite of an 
opaque causation with hunger and malnutrition which seemed to boil down to an 
expectation – naïve by any analytical standards – that increased tax revenues from 
FDI would create larger resource for investment in agriculture. Furthermore, the 
strong emphasis on smallholder farming and local technological change that came 
from early meetings and the small member organisations of the campaign was lost. 
Through the Tories and the G8, the ‘solving hunger through business and science’ 
and new Green Revolution corporate-state project garnered highly publicised 
commitments of resource.  
The fact that the campaign took care to establish campaign aims which did not 
require specific targets of achievement connected to metrics or discrete policies 
does not only raise questions about the way one might evaluate campaign success; it 
also opens up a deeper analytical question about how success and failure are 
constructed. In essence, EFIF was set up not to fail. The demands it made were 
sufficiently broad and integrated into Government initiatives as to make it possible 
to put a positive spin on practically any outcome from the G8 in terms of 
commitments to address hunger and malnutrition. The breadth, generality, and 
creeping moderation of EFIF’s demands necessarily left space for those who wished 
it to declare success. This might be considered not so much as a ‘failure’ of the 
campaign to get certain things achieved, but rather as a strategy elaborated within 
the specific conditions of the time. We will now explore other ways in which this was 
so. 
 
CONSTRUCTING SUCCESS 
Success for EFIF was framed in a specific way. The framing of success was not 
strongly oriented towards the policy achievements and resource commitments 
emanating from the campaign’s pressure on the G8 which, we have argued, was 
difficult to discern. Success in terms of G8 action was, at best, broadly implied, 
partial or affirmed rather than demonstrated. The concrete outcomes of the 
campaign were only positive in the sense of possibly leading to some action by G8 
states in areas that had already been identified by the British government as 
possible areas for action. The G8 (which saw global hunger as one issue amongst 
others) did not make strong clear commitments for action in any case. Since 2013, 
those who drove the EFIF campaign have not followed up or campaigned to ensure 
that the areas of success have been realised. It is very obvious that, to date, little has 
been achieved in reducing mass hunger and malnutrition and what success has been 
achieved can hardly be accounted for by G8 agency. 
But there was very positive affect in the wrap-up meeting which put a kind of seal on 
a campaign that had worked well enough to establish a kind of besieged modus 
operandi for coalition campaigning: strategically cautious, aware of the difficulties of 
coalition building, and in some sense therapeutic for an NGO sector that was looking 
for a sense of renewal in hard times. Principally this message was directed towards 
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those within the coalition itself. Although entirely subjective, this observer was 
struck by how much time and energy was spent in assembly meetings talking up the 
project itself in ways that seemed to border on motivational speaking. 
Enough Food If did not achieve a brand or legacy in the way that Band Aid, Jubilee 
2000, or Make Poverty History did. Even the most sympathetic reading would not 
claim that EFIF had a big impact on British government development practice. It did 
not become part of Britain’s ‘ribbon culture’ (Moore 2010).  
Although there was broad and positive media coverage of the campaign’s ‘event’ 
high spots, there was less media reporting of mission accomplished or success. There 
was no high profile media event to relate the campaign’s successes to the general 
public. The campaign coalition’s main success comes from its achievements in 
organising a campaign coalition, establishing a relationship with government, and re-
energising its existing members during a politically depressing period. This kind of 
success derived from strategic decisions made by the coalition’s managers. 
 
The EFIF campaign: short and sweet? 
The campaign itself was effectively six months long. Aware of how MPH had tailed 
off after the G8 and that coalition member commitment had waned, EFIF focused on 
the G8 summit in June and then held a wrap-up meeting for coalition members in 
July. As noted, the wrap-up meeting was overlain with a ‘success’ message which 
was not strongly evidenced and left no space for clear critical reflection. There was 
no ‘next steps’ moment either, although an evaluation consultancy was 
commissioned (Tibbett and Stalker 2014).  
The first campaign meeting was in camera. Some campaign organisations attended 
this first meeting and then left the coalition on the grounds that it reproduced the 
moderate and (in their view) apolitical strategy that came to dominate MPH.xvi In this 
sense EFIF had, by its first meeting open to all organisations, defined itself around 
the ‘BOAG’ NGOs and without the larger ‘radical’ NGOs. This had the effect of 
reducing the political tensions that had for a time pervaded Make Poverty History. 
The first open general assembly of EFIF (16th November 2012) commenced with 
some scene-setting addresses from those in the coordination team. There was a 
strong affective content in these addresses that aimed to produce an affirmative and 
encompassing feeling in the venue. One key speaker related how good it felt to be 
back together again, implicitly referencing the sense of break-up left by MPH. Even 
in this first general meeting, there was a strong framing of the campaign around 
what one speaker called ‘ending well’ and ‘celebrating’. This is, of course, entirely 
understandable at the start of a project to build a coalition. But, it was also 
noteworthy that there was no sense of contention (Tarrow 2005), uncertainty, 
struggle, or opposition upon which a mobilisation might be constructed. One 
representative who asked if hunger and malnutrition could be meaningfully 
addressed in the absence of demands to end the ‘war on terror’ was pointedly 
excluded, although the points he made were quite reasonable.xvii 
Beyond the ‘0.7’, was no specific target setting, identification of a basket of specific 
policy ‘asks’ from G8 governments, or clear identification of problem of hunger. The 
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four themes of investment, land, tax, and transparency were announced as the 
orientations of EFIF. As the assembly meetings proceeded and campaign material 
and activity emerged, it was clear that the themes of the campaign were designed 
not to rely on specific, ambitious, but realistic targets in the way that MPH and 
Jubilee 2000 had been. Rather, these themes served as the aspirational focus for the 
campaign, each framed with a more or less specific cause and effect. Stop land 
grabbing to protect smallholders, invest and give aid to improve agricultural 
productivity, reduce tax avoidance to improve revenues that could be invested in 
agriculture, and make ‘governments and investors to be honest and open about the 
deals they make in the poorest countries that stop people getting enough food’.xviii 
These themes are presented with very vague causations, no specific demands and – 
especially in the case of the final theme – stretch a clear sense of cause and effect. 
Within assembly meetings, the coalition was theme-driven, not target-driven in 
terms of its demands. The bulk of meetings’ content was oriented towards the 
management of media (electronic and print) and public attitudes. As a result, the 
meetings were mainly concerned with the processes and progress of coalition 
building. The complex questions about campaign demands, and the causations 
behind hunger and malnutrition were rarely mooted. 
The shortness and sweetness structured into the campaign makes sense from a post-
2010 campaign recovery point-of-view; but as a way to deal with the massive and 
complex issue of hunger and malnutrition, it raises a very important issue. The 
campaign’s organisation and duration made it constitutively unable to address global 
malnutrition and hunger in any meaningful fashion. The core issues relating to 
hunger and malnutrition are at least as complex as those of international debt, 
apartheid, and slavery and in each of those campaign areas, coalitions endured for 
years and even generations. There is no amount of campaign success that can be 
compressed into a six-month period that would come close to addressing global 
hunger and malnutrition in any meaningful sense.  
EFIF was a coalition that was sensitive to the plurality of its coalition members but, in 
the absence of the larger ‘radical’ NGOs, it worked through the larger and well-
resourced mainstream development NGOs. EFIF was both inclusive, open-ended, not 
tied to any specific achievements, and de facto dominated by the large campaign 
organisations. It was designed in a strictly time-constrained fashion that ensured it 
did not collapse or lose energy. It worked well in generating a campaign coalition but 
far less so as a vehicle to identify clear targets and exacting actions attached to them.  
 
Adjusting expectations 
Ensuring success also required the construction of a strong policy and vision overlap 
with government. The absence of contentious or adversarial content in the 
campaign would make it highly likely that the campaign could be broadly positive 
about government actions and, as a result, narrate the campaign as having had a 
positive effect on government action. 
During the first open assembly meeting – and repeated throughout subsequent 
meetings – a message was related that the Conservative government was amenable 
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to EFIF and that there was a real window of opportunity for the campaign. In the 
words of the Chair of the Policy and Advocacy Working Group, Cameron was ‘saying 
some really good stuff.’ This framing effectively removed the notion of an adverse 
political environment from the campaign. One might suppose that NGO campaigns 
often tag onto larger and more ‘official’ and governmental initiatives (Hilton et al. 
2013), but in this case the window of opportunity afforded by the moments from the 
Olympic ‘summit’ to the G8 meeting was narrow indeed and no explicit reflection on 
this fact or the dangers of attaching hope to a political party strongly wedded to 
neoliberal values can be found in any of the materials from the campaign or the 
discussions within the assembly meetings.  
The major NGOs in BOND were meeting with senior members of the Conservative 
and Liberal Democrat parties as soon as possible after the election victory. In this 
period, Cameron’s strategy for the Tories was based in what were at the time judged 
to be relatively ‘liberal’ political ideas, revolving around wellbeing and the ‘big 
society’. The Conservatives were also well aware that a certain kind of presentation 
of international development had worked well for New Labour as a way to represent 
a political aesthetic of national grandeur and moral purpose. Positive signals about 
international development offered a fairly straightforward way to address the issue 
coined by now-Prime Minister Theresa May, of being perceived as the ‘nasty party’.  
There was, in effect, a mutual desire by major campaign groups and the new 
coalition government, to find a cohabitation within which both could claim a moral 
virtue as progressive development actors, and an agenda was discovered to enable 
this comity. ‘Hunger’ was the venue within which this was achieved. David Cameron 
articulated his ‘golden threads’ of development: ‘stable government, lack of 
corruption, human rights, the rule of law, transparent information’. The campaign 
coalition interpreted this core directive within Cameron’s declared development 
vision as positive and fairly easy to work with. One can readily see how it maps quite 
extensively onto the four themes of EFIF. In none of the meetings I attended was 
Cameron’s golden thread notion articulated in a critical fashion.  
Cameron generated a strong formulation of both problem and solution in regards to 
hunger that fulsomely fitted with a liberal and globalist Conservative worldview in 
which well-meaning transnational corporations, supported by governments and 
amenable scientists, would disseminate technologies, techniques, and financial 
mechanisms that would engineer peasant households into petty entrepreneurs able 
to upscale their own well-being. This agenda went under the rubric ‘solving 
malnutrition and hunger through business and science’. The ‘science’ part of this 
phrasing effectively meant corporately-owned technologies such as improved seeds, 
fertilisers, and pesticides.  
EFIF reconciled itself to this vision. It invited Bill Gates to speak at its event and it did 
not make any strong critical statements of Cameron’s vision for solving hunger. EFIF 
‘wished the leaders well’ in their meetings. Beyond the main stage performances, 
the main event was the planting of a field of ‘windmill’ flowers to represent the 
number of children who died from malnutrition, an event that could hardly have 
been more apolitical.  
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As the G8 event approached, the campaign’s messages on hunger and malnutrition 
and the those of the Government came to overlap. Cameron’s explicitly pro-business, 
technocratic, and financialised model of change was devised within his government, 
did not change, and was announced as the agenda for his leadership of the G8. It 
was accompanied by a broad and open-ended EFIF coalition which was based on 
thematic overlaps with government, broad aspirations rather than demands, and a 
lack of critical positions on the Conservatives’ vision of development. These 
properties ensured that any outcomes from the G8 could feasibly look like success. 
In sum, 2013 saw EFIF briefly generate an effective international development 
coalition in the teeth of inter-organisational trepidation and a broader political 
environment defined by austerity and a shift to the Right in UK governance. 
Inasmuch as one judges EFIF a success in managing a coalition that worked and did 
not generate a problematic legacy, one has also to understand its failure to make 
any kind of ‘historic’ progress in regards to hunger and malnutrition.  
 
CONCLUSION: POST-WRISTBAND BLUES 
The EFIF campaign can be understood as a response by development NGOs to a 
particularly challenging environment. In the teeth of a shift to the Right and a 
recession, NGOs set out a coalition that had as its primary aim establishing the 
beginnings of a modus vivendi in a new period. This did not translate into new, 
strong, and ambitious campaign demands. But, its success can be identified in its 
more internalised focus on making campaign coalitions based in a relationship with a 
less amenable government possible. This explains why the  organisation of the 
campaign was based in broad thematic aspirations that enjoyed a substantial 
overlap with Government agendas that were devised by-and-large independently 
from the development NGOs. It also explains why the campaign itself was highly 
time-constrained, generalised, and articulated in ways that did not expect specific 
outcome ‘wins’.  
EFIF’s legacy is slender indeed. It’s public visibility was not sufficiently strong to 
create a ‘historic’ brand in the way that Jubilee 2000 and Make Poverty History did. 
In the midst of the moderate financial commitments of the G8 and the modality 
through which the ‘hunger issue’ is addressed by the corporate-state nexus EFIF did 
not collate a clear set of policies, demands, or political values to make a distinct 
contribution. The most obvious way in which they could have done this would have 
been through some evocation of the notion of ‘food sovereignty’, but this term was 
closely associated with the more radical campaign NGOs who removed themselves 
from the campaign. Food sovereignty would also have generated clear light between 
the campaign coalition and the Government. Contrastingly, one EFIF activity involved 
asking schoolchildren to write a message to David Cameron about hunger on a plate. 
This led to a very nice photo opportunity for Cameron on 7
th
 June to pose outside 
Number Ten with a selection of kids and accompanied by David Walliams.  
Many individual development NGOs in the UK remain politically active and 
intellectually ambitious. Some of the leading NGOs in the EFIF coalition have ‘radical’ 
campaign foci that resemble the kinds of values associated with the food sovereignty 
movement or other radical campaign positions. Indeed, a major response to MPH 
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was to reflect on possible campaign strategies that were more radical in many ways. 
The key report here, Finding Frames (Darnton and Kirk 2011),xix was read by many in 
leadership positions within large development NGOs just before the moment that 
the EFIF campaign commenced. Its core argument was that more medium-term 
cognitive shifts in what international development meant were required in order for 
development campaigning to escape from well-entrenched public attitudes 
concerning famine and charity. The report emphasises justice and equality rather 
than charity and poverty (Kirk 2012). It also argues that broad and shallow public 
appeals are immanently constrained in their ambition, and that focussed and deeper 
engagements are likely to be more politically forceful. Seen in the context of Finding 
Frames and the influence that this report had, EFIF’s contrived success seems all the 
more concerning because its strategic orientation shifted campaign politics away 
from the Report in spite of the latter’s popularity and stepped-up ambition. In the 
case of EFIF, perhaps the costs of success outweighed its benefits.  
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releases/2013/05/make-poverty-history-and-g8-promises-was-it-all-really-worth-it.  
ii There were – and there remain – diverging views on the outcomes of the G8. There 
was a generally positive note concerning the commitments to write off debt to 
highly indebted countries and to commit to increases in aid up to $50bn by 2010. 
There was debate concerning whether this was enough, or whether it would be 
effective in reducing global poverty significantly. There was some confusion 
concerning the relation between debt write-off and aid commitment. Regarding the 
third issue, trade justice, there was a more concerted disappointment amongst 
campaign organisations. 
iii By the 2007 G8 meeting at Heiligendamm, many NGOs considered the G8 to have 
failed to commit fully to the 2005 outcomes.  
iv Although I will dispense with the quotation marks, it is important to note that the 
notion of hunger is a heavily constructed political term more than it is a specific 
calorific requirement. In the UK, it’s normative content and the kinds of identities it 
produces have tended to gravitate towards the charitable image of the famine victim. 
This concern that hunger evoked old-fashioned charitable appeals was expressed on 
numerous occasions during the EFIF coalition meetings. 
v The BOAG (big overseas aid group) Chief Executives met with David Cameron 
before EFIF was commenced (notes from coalition meeting, 16
th
 November 2012). 
BOAG consists of ActionAid, Oxfam, CAFOD, Save the Children and Christian Aid. 
vi The BOAG campaign NGOs had been meeting informally since mid 2011. The 
author attended general assembly planning meetings throughout 2012 and 2013. 
Much of the information in this section derives from the notes of those meetings. 
vii The author attended this launch meeting. 
viii
 The commitment became law in 2015. 
ix Like many of Cameron’s attempts to disseminate ‘big ideas’, the golden thread 
notion was rather opaque and not especially prominent. In Cameron’s words: ‘you 
only get real long-term development through aid if there is also a golden thread of 
stable government, lack of corruption, human rights, the rule of law, transparent 
information.’ One can see that this fits with the ‘three Ts’ and with facets of the EFIF 
agenda. 
x N=476. The coalition expected 30,000 to attend, and some estimates were as high 
as 40,000. This did not reflect my own observations. The survey team distributed 
3,000 surveys through a purposive sampling of one in ten and covered the entire 
field. 
xi Bill Gates’ relation to international development campaigning is controversial and, 
in the context of this article, revealing. See McGoey (2015). 
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xii The Nutrition for Growth summit was protested by NGOs which had decided not 
to participate in EFIF. 
xiii This is clear from EFIF’s own collating of G8 media coverage. 
xiv From The Guardian and The Telegraph respectively, both June 18th.  
xv
 From research notes of the meeting held on 5
th
 July. 
xvi Notably here: War on Want and Global Justice Now (formerly World Development 
Movement). 
xvii
 The relationship between war and hunger is a common theme within livelihoods 
and famine research. See for example Keen (2008) Macrae and Zwi (1994) 
xviii Taken from http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/2013-01/enough-food-everyone-
if. I have directly quoted this last theme because it is difficult to paraphrase in a clear 
or concise fashion. I am not sure what it means. 
xix See also Hampson 2006 
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